Insight into General Robert E. Lee's Civil War Surrender
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Date Published: November 5, 2024
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This speech was delivered to the American Antiquarian Society in October, 1901 by Charles Francis Adams, who was the grandson of John Quincy Adams—the 6th President of the United States, and great-grandson of John Adams—the 2nd President of the United States. Peter E. Greulich has performed some very minor edits to update the language and flow of the text to twenty-first century practices. He has also added the headings and subtitles to assist the reader.
Any mistakes in these areas are his sole responsibility and, if noted, will be corrected.
Any mistakes in these areas are his sole responsibility and, if noted, will be corrected.
Peter E. Greulich, November 2024
A People’s Obligation to Robert E. Lee
- The Purpose of this Presentation
- Jefferson Davis Calls for a War of Attrition in the South
- Two of General Lee’s Direct Reports Express Different Perspectives
- General Henry A. Wise Expresses His Opinion
- General E. P. Alexander Expresses His Opinion
- Lee Disregards Jefferson Davis’s Wishes and Its Impact on the Confederacy
- An Overseas Perspective: The South Could Not Be Defeated
- What if the Civil War Had Been a Never-Ending War?
- What if Robert E. Lee Had Supported Jefferson Davis’ Unyielding Position?
- Use a Current Event to Look Back on United States History
- Robert E. Lee Returns Home
The Purpose of this Presentation
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The present seems a sufficiently proper occasion, and this—not an inappropriate place, to call attention to a matter sufficiently germane to the purpose of this Society, though hardly as yet antiquarian. Historical in its character, it conveys a lesson of grave present import.
One of the most unhappy and disastrous wars since the fall of Napoleon is in South Africa. It is now working itself to a close, though apparently still remote and in every unsatisfactory way. There is reason to think that the conflict was unnecessary in its inception; that by timely and judicious action it might long since have been brought to a close; and that it now continues simply because the parties to it cannot be brought together to discuss and arrive at a sensible basis of adjustment—a basis upon which both in reality would be not unwilling to agree. Nevertheless, as the cable dispatches daily show, the contest drags wearily along, to the probable destruction of one of the combatants, to the great loss of the other and, so far as can be seen, in utter disregard of the best interests of both. |
Short biography of Charles F. Adams Jr.
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My immediate purpose, however, is to draw attention to the hair-breadth escape we [in the United States] ourselves had from a similar experience, now thirty-six years ago, and to assign to whom it belongs the credit for that escape.
In one word, in the strong light of passing events, I think it now opportune to set forth the debt of gratitude this reunited country of ours—Union and Confederate, North and South—owes to Robert E. Lee, of Virginia.
Most of those here—for this is not a body of young individuals—remember the state of affairs which existed in the United States, especially in what was then known as the Confederate States, or the rebellious portion of the United States, in April, 1865. Such as are not yet as mature as that memory implies, have read and heard thereof. It was in every respect almost the identical state of affairs which existed in South Africa at the time of the capture of Pretoria by General Roberts, in June a year ago.
In one word, in the strong light of passing events, I think it now opportune to set forth the debt of gratitude this reunited country of ours—Union and Confederate, North and South—owes to Robert E. Lee, of Virginia.
Most of those here—for this is not a body of young individuals—remember the state of affairs which existed in the United States, especially in what was then known as the Confederate States, or the rebellious portion of the United States, in April, 1865. Such as are not yet as mature as that memory implies, have read and heard thereof. It was in every respect almost the identical state of affairs which existed in South Africa at the time of the capture of Pretoria by General Roberts, in June a year ago.
Jefferson Davis Calls for a War of Attrition in the South
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On the 2nd of April, 1865, the Confederate army found itself compelled to abandon the lines in front of Petersburg; and the same day—a very famous Sabbath—Jefferson Davis, hastily called from the church services he was attending, left Richmond to find, if he might, a new seat of government, at Danville.
The following morning our [Union] forces at last entered the rebel capital. This was on a Monday; and, two days later, the Confederate President issued from Danville his manifesto, declaring to the people of the South that: “We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. |
The policy and line of military action herein indicated were precisely those laid down and pursued by the Boer leaders during the last sixteen months.
It is unnecessary for me even to refer to the series of events which followed our occupation of Richmond, and preceded the surrender of Appomattox. It is sufficient to say that on the Friday which followed the momentous Sunday, the capitulation of the Army of Northern Virginia had become inevitable.
Not the less for that, the course thereafter to be pursued as concerned further resistance on the part of the Confederacy was still to be decided. As his Danville proclamation showed, Jefferson Davis, though face to face with grave disaster, had not for an instant given up the thought of continuing the struggle. To do so was certainly practicable—far more practicable than now in South Africa, both as respects forces in the field and in the area of country to be covered by the invader.
Foreign opinion was on this point settled. In Europe, it was assumed as a certainty of the future that the conquest of the Confederacy was “impossible.” The English journals had always maintained, and still did maintain, that the defeat of Lee in the field, or even the surrender of all the Confederate armies, would be but the close of one phase of the war and the opening of another—the final phase being a long, fruitless effort to subdue a people, at once united and resolved, occupying a region so vast that it would be impossible to penetrate every portion of it, much less to hold it in peaceful subjugation.
As a historical fact on this point, the scales on the 9th of April, 1865, hung wavering in the balance; a mere turn of the hand would decide which way they were to incline. Thus, on the morning of that momentous day, it was an absolutely open question, an even chance, whether the course which subsequently was pursued should be pursued, or whether the leaders of the Confederacy would adopt the policy which President Kruger and Generals Botha and De Wet have in South Africa more recently adopted, and are now pursuing.
The decision rested in the hands of one man, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Fairly reliable and very graphic accounts of what took place at General Lee’s headquarters in the early morning hours of April 9th have either appeared in print or been told in conversation, and to two of these accounts I propose to call attention.
Apparently the second of the interviews described followed close on the first, not more than a couple of hours intervening between them.
It is unnecessary for me even to refer to the series of events which followed our occupation of Richmond, and preceded the surrender of Appomattox. It is sufficient to say that on the Friday which followed the momentous Sunday, the capitulation of the Army of Northern Virginia had become inevitable.
Not the less for that, the course thereafter to be pursued as concerned further resistance on the part of the Confederacy was still to be decided. As his Danville proclamation showed, Jefferson Davis, though face to face with grave disaster, had not for an instant given up the thought of continuing the struggle. To do so was certainly practicable—far more practicable than now in South Africa, both as respects forces in the field and in the area of country to be covered by the invader.
Foreign opinion was on this point settled. In Europe, it was assumed as a certainty of the future that the conquest of the Confederacy was “impossible.” The English journals had always maintained, and still did maintain, that the defeat of Lee in the field, or even the surrender of all the Confederate armies, would be but the close of one phase of the war and the opening of another—the final phase being a long, fruitless effort to subdue a people, at once united and resolved, occupying a region so vast that it would be impossible to penetrate every portion of it, much less to hold it in peaceful subjugation.
As a historical fact on this point, the scales on the 9th of April, 1865, hung wavering in the balance; a mere turn of the hand would decide which way they were to incline. Thus, on the morning of that momentous day, it was an absolutely open question, an even chance, whether the course which subsequently was pursued should be pursued, or whether the leaders of the Confederacy would adopt the policy which President Kruger and Generals Botha and De Wet have in South Africa more recently adopted, and are now pursuing.
The decision rested in the hands of one man, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Fairly reliable and very graphic accounts of what took place at General Lee’s headquarters in the early morning hours of April 9th have either appeared in print or been told in conversation, and to two of these accounts I propose to call attention.
Apparently the second of the interviews described followed close on the first, not more than a couple of hours intervening between them.
Two of General Lee’s Direct Reports Express Different Perspectives
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Of the first, I find this account in a book recently published by John Sargent Wise, entitled “The End of an Era--select to read book review.” John Sargent Wise is the son of Henry A. Wise, once prominent in our national politics. Governor of Virginia in the later “fifties,” the father was subsequently a brigadier-general in the Confederate service. Though in 1865 but a youth of nineteen, John S. Wise was a hot Confederate, and had already been wounded in battle.
At the time in question he chanced to have been sent with dispatches to Lee by Jefferson Davis who was then on his way to Danville; and while seeking Lee’s headquarters he came, in the early morning of April 9th, across his father, Governor [of Virginia] and General Wise, in bivouac with his brigade. The father was then nearly sixty years of age, but the son found him wrapped in a blanket, stretched on the ground like a common soldier, and asleep among his men. A typical Southern “fire-eater” of the extreme type, Henry A. Wise was an out-and-out Secessionist and Confederate. Aroused from an uneasy slumber, almost the first wish he expressed was to see General Lee, and he asked impetuously of his whereabouts. The son knew where the headquarters of the Confederate commander were, and the two started together to go to them. John S. Wise has described vividly the aspect of affairs as they passed along: |
John S. Wise, son of General Henry A. Wise pictured in Confederate uniform.
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“The roads and fields were filled with stragglers. They moved looking behind them, as if they expected to be attacked and harried by a pursuing foe. Demoralized, panic, abandonment of all hope, appeared on every hand. Wagons were rolling along without any order or system. Caissons and limber-chests without commanding officers seemed to be floating aimlessly upon a tide of disorganization. [Footnote #1]
“Rising to his full height, casting a glance around him like that of an eagle, and sweeping the horizon with his long arm and bony forefinger, my father exclaimed: ‘This is the end!’
“It is impossible to convey an idea of the agony and the bitterness of his words and gestures.”
Then follows this description of the interview which ensued:
- General Henry A. Wise Expresses His Opinion
“We found General Lee on the rear portico of the house that I have mentioned. He had washed his face in a tin basin, and stood drying his beard with a coarse towel as we approached. ‘General Lee,’ exclaimed my father, ‘my poor, brave men are lying on yonder hill more dead than alive. For more than a week they have been fighting day and night, without food, and, by God, sir, they shall not move another step until somebody gives them something to eat!’
“ ‘Come in, general,’ said General Lee soothingly. ‘They deserve something to eat, and shall have it; and meanwhile you shall share my breakfast.’
“He disarmed everything like defiance by his kindness.
“It was but a few moments, however, before my father launched forth in a fresh denunciation of the conduct of General Bushrod Johnson [Footnote #2] in the engagement of the sixth. I am satisfied that General Lee felt as he did; but, assuming an air of mock severity, Lee said, ‘General, are you aware that you are liable to court-martial and execution for insubordination and disrespect toward your commanding officer?’
“My father looked at him with lifted eyebrows and flashing eyes, and exclaimed: ‘Shot! You can’t afford to shoot the men who fight for cursing those who ran away. Shot! I wish you would shoot me. If you don’t, some Yankee probably will within the next twenty-four hours.’
“Growing more serious, General Lee inquired what he thought of the situation.
“ ‘Situation?’ said the bold old man. ‘There is no situation! Nothing remains, General Lee, but to put your poor men on your poor mules and send them home in time for spring ploughing. This army is hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming demoralized. These men have already endured more than I believed flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you, sir, emphatically, that to prolong the struggle is murder, and the blood of every man who is killed from this time forth is on your head, General Lee.’
“This last expression seemed to cause General Lee great pain. With a gesture of remonstrance, and even of impatience, he protested: ‘General, do not talk so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough. What would the country think of me, if I did what you suggest?’
“ ‘Come in, general,’ said General Lee soothingly. ‘They deserve something to eat, and shall have it; and meanwhile you shall share my breakfast.’
“He disarmed everything like defiance by his kindness.
“It was but a few moments, however, before my father launched forth in a fresh denunciation of the conduct of General Bushrod Johnson [Footnote #2] in the engagement of the sixth. I am satisfied that General Lee felt as he did; but, assuming an air of mock severity, Lee said, ‘General, are you aware that you are liable to court-martial and execution for insubordination and disrespect toward your commanding officer?’
“My father looked at him with lifted eyebrows and flashing eyes, and exclaimed: ‘Shot! You can’t afford to shoot the men who fight for cursing those who ran away. Shot! I wish you would shoot me. If you don’t, some Yankee probably will within the next twenty-four hours.’
“Growing more serious, General Lee inquired what he thought of the situation.
“ ‘Situation?’ said the bold old man. ‘There is no situation! Nothing remains, General Lee, but to put your poor men on your poor mules and send them home in time for spring ploughing. This army is hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming demoralized. These men have already endured more than I believed flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you, sir, emphatically, that to prolong the struggle is murder, and the blood of every man who is killed from this time forth is on your head, General Lee.’
“This last expression seemed to cause General Lee great pain. With a gesture of remonstrance, and even of impatience, he protested: ‘General, do not talk so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough. What would the country think of me, if I did what you suggest?’
“ ‘Country be damned!’ was the quick reply.
“ ‘There is no country. There has been no country, general, for a year or more.
“ ‘You are the country to these men. They have fought for you. They have shivered through a long winter for you. Without pay or clothes, or care of any sort, their devotion to you and faith in you have been the only things which have held this army together.
“ ‘If you demand the sacrifice, there are still thousands of us left who will die for you. You know the game is desperate beyond redemption, and that, if you so announce, no man or government or people will gainsay your decision. That is why I repeat that the blood of any man killed hereafter is upon your head.’
“General Lee stood for some time at an open window, looking out at the throng now surging upon the roads and in the fields, and made no response.” [Footnote #3]
It will be remembered that John Sargent Wise was individually present at this conversation, a youth of nineteen. I have as little respect as any one well can have for the recollection of thirty years since as a basis of history. Nevertheless, it would seem quite out of the question that a youth of only nineteen could have been present at such a scene as is here described, and that the words which then passed, and the incidents which occurred, should not have been indelibly imprinted upon his memory. I am disposed, therefore, to consider this reliable historical material.
Meanwhile, it so happens that I am able to supplement it by similar testimony from another quarter.
Meanwhile, it so happens that I am able to supplement it by similar testimony from another quarter.
- General E. P. Alexander Expresses His Opinion
Some years ago I was, for a considerable period, closely associated with General E. P. Alexander who had been Chief of Artillery in Longstreet’s famous corps; It was General Alexander who, on the morning of July 3, 1863, opened on the Union line at Gettysburg what Hancock described as “a most terrific and appalling cannonade,” intended to prepare the way for the advance of Pickett’s division.
In April, 1865, General Alexander was, if my recollection serves me right, in command of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia. General Alexander’s memory I found always singularly tenacious as well as accurate, and he delighted in reminiscence of the great war he so many times repeated to me or to others within my hearing, the details of an interview he had with Lee on the morning of the 9th of April, not long, it would seem, after Wise had left him.
Of what he said, I have since retained a vivid recollection.
On the morning in question, General Alexander had an occasion to report to Lee. He realized that the Army of Northern Virginia was then in a desperate situation. Moreover, as he knew, the limber-chests were running low; his arm of the service was in no condition to go into another engagement. Yet the idea of an abandonment of the cause had never occurred to him as among the probabilities.
All night he had lain awake, thinking as to what was next to be done.
Finally he had come to the conclusion that there was but one course to pursue.
The Confederate army, while nominally capitulating, must in reality disperse, and those composing it should be instructed, whether individually or as part of detachments, to get each man to his own State in the most direct way and shortest possible time, and report to the governor thereof, with a view to a further and continuous resistance.
Thus, exactly what is now taking place in South Africa was to take place in the Confederacy.
General Alexander told me that, as he passed his batteries on his way to headquarters, the men called out to him, in cheery tone, that there were still some rounds remaining in the caissons, and that they were ready to renew the fight.
He found Lee seated on the trunk of a fallen tree before a dying campfire. He was dressed in uniform, and invited Alexander to take a seat beside him. Lee then asked his opinion of the situation and of the proper course to be pursued. Full of the idea which dominated his mind, Alexander proceeded at once to propound his plan for it seemed to him the only plan worthy of consideration.
As he went on, General Lee, looking steadily into the fire with an abstracted air, listened patiently. Alexander said his full say. A brief pause ensued, which Lee finally broke, somewhat in these words:
In April, 1865, General Alexander was, if my recollection serves me right, in command of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia. General Alexander’s memory I found always singularly tenacious as well as accurate, and he delighted in reminiscence of the great war he so many times repeated to me or to others within my hearing, the details of an interview he had with Lee on the morning of the 9th of April, not long, it would seem, after Wise had left him.
Of what he said, I have since retained a vivid recollection.
On the morning in question, General Alexander had an occasion to report to Lee. He realized that the Army of Northern Virginia was then in a desperate situation. Moreover, as he knew, the limber-chests were running low; his arm of the service was in no condition to go into another engagement. Yet the idea of an abandonment of the cause had never occurred to him as among the probabilities.
All night he had lain awake, thinking as to what was next to be done.
Finally he had come to the conclusion that there was but one course to pursue.
The Confederate army, while nominally capitulating, must in reality disperse, and those composing it should be instructed, whether individually or as part of detachments, to get each man to his own State in the most direct way and shortest possible time, and report to the governor thereof, with a view to a further and continuous resistance.
Thus, exactly what is now taking place in South Africa was to take place in the Confederacy.
General Alexander told me that, as he passed his batteries on his way to headquarters, the men called out to him, in cheery tone, that there were still some rounds remaining in the caissons, and that they were ready to renew the fight.
He found Lee seated on the trunk of a fallen tree before a dying campfire. He was dressed in uniform, and invited Alexander to take a seat beside him. Lee then asked his opinion of the situation and of the proper course to be pursued. Full of the idea which dominated his mind, Alexander proceeded at once to propound his plan for it seemed to him the only plan worthy of consideration.
As he went on, General Lee, looking steadily into the fire with an abstracted air, listened patiently. Alexander said his full say. A brief pause ensued, which Lee finally broke, somewhat in these words:
“No! General Alexander, that will not do. You must remember we are a Christian people. We have fought this fight as long as, and as well as, we knew how. We have been defeated. For us, as a Christian people, there is now but one course to pursue.
“We must accept the situation; these men must go home and plant a crop, and we must proceed to build up our country on a new basis.
“We cannot have recourse to the methods you suggest.”
I remember being deeply impressed with Alexander’s comment, as he repeated these words of Lee. They had evidently burned themselves into his memory.
He said:
He said:
“I had nothing more to say. I felt that the man had soared way up above me—he dominated me completely. I rose from beside him; silently mounted my horse; rode back to my command; and waited for the order to surrender.”
Then and there, Lee decided its course for the Confederacy; and I take it there is not one solitary man in the United States today, North or South, who does not feel that he decided right.
Lee Disregards Jefferson Davis’s Wishes and Its Impact on the Confederacy
The Army of Northern Virginia, it will be remembered, laid down its arms on the 9th of April. But General Joseph Johnston was in command of another Confederate army then confronting Sherman, in North Carolina, and it was still an open question what course he would pursue. His force numbered over 40,000 combatants; more than the entire muster of the Boers in their best estate.
Lee’s course decided Johnston’s.
S. R. Mallory, who was present on the occasion, has left a striking account of a species of council held at Greensboro, North Carolina, on the evening of the 10th of April, by Jefferson Davis and the members of his cabinet, with General Johnston.
Davis, stubborn in temper and bent on a policy of continuous irregular resistance, expressed the belief that the disasters recently sustained, though terrible, “should not be regarded fatal.” “I think,” he added, “we can whip the enemy yet, if our people will turn out.”
When he ceased speaking, a pause ensued. Davis at last said, “We should like to hear your views, General Johnston.”
Whereupon Johnston, without preface or introduction, and with a tone and manner almost spiteful, remarked in his terse, concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were crowding for utterance: “My views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight.” [Footnote #4]
We all know what followed. Lee’s great military prestige and moral ascendancy made it easy for some of the remaining Confederate commanders—like Johnston—to follow the precedent he set; while others of them—like Kirby Smith—found it imposed upon them.
A firm direction had been given to the course of events; an intelligible policy was indicated.
Lee’s course decided Johnston’s.
S. R. Mallory, who was present on the occasion, has left a striking account of a species of council held at Greensboro, North Carolina, on the evening of the 10th of April, by Jefferson Davis and the members of his cabinet, with General Johnston.
Davis, stubborn in temper and bent on a policy of continuous irregular resistance, expressed the belief that the disasters recently sustained, though terrible, “should not be regarded fatal.” “I think,” he added, “we can whip the enemy yet, if our people will turn out.”
When he ceased speaking, a pause ensued. Davis at last said, “We should like to hear your views, General Johnston.”
Whereupon Johnston, without preface or introduction, and with a tone and manner almost spiteful, remarked in his terse, concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were crowding for utterance: “My views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight.” [Footnote #4]
We all know what followed. Lee’s great military prestige and moral ascendancy made it easy for some of the remaining Confederate commanders—like Johnston—to follow the precedent he set; while others of them—like Kirby Smith—found it imposed upon them.
A firm direction had been given to the course of events; an intelligible policy was indicated.
An Overseas Perspective: The South Could Not Be Defeated
I have in my possession a copy of the “Index,” the weekly journal published in London during our Civil War. It was the official organ of the Confederate agents in Europe, it was intended for the better enlightenment of foreign opinion, more especially the English press.
The surrender of Lee was commented upon editorially in the issue of that paper for April 27th.
The surrender of Lee was commented upon editorially in the issue of that paper for April 27th.
“The war is far from being concluded. A strenuous resistance and not surrender was the unalterable determination of the Confederate authorities … If the worst comes to the worst there is the trans-Mississippi department, where the remnant of [Johnston’s] army can find a shelter, and a new and safe starting-point.”
On the 11th of May, the surrender of Johnston’s army was announced on the same terms as that of Lee; but, in summing up the situation, the “Index” still found “the elements of a successful or at least a protracted resistance.”
On the 25th of May, it had an article entitled “Southern Resistance in Texas,” in which it announced that, “Such a war will be fierce, ferocious, and of long duration.” In a word, such an expiring struggle as we are today witnessing in South Africa.
In its June 1st issue the “Index” commented on “The capture of President Davis;” and only then—and not until then, forestalling the trans-Mississippi surrender of Kirby Smith brought to it by the following mail, it raised the wailing cry:
“Fuit Ilium … The South has fallen.” [Footnote #5]
On the 25th of May, it had an article entitled “Southern Resistance in Texas,” in which it announced that, “Such a war will be fierce, ferocious, and of long duration.” In a word, such an expiring struggle as we are today witnessing in South Africa.
In its June 1st issue the “Index” commented on “The capture of President Davis;” and only then—and not until then, forestalling the trans-Mississippi surrender of Kirby Smith brought to it by the following mail, it raised the wailing cry:
“Fuit Ilium … The South has fallen.” [Footnote #5]
What if the Civil War Had Been a Never-Ending War?
Comparing the situation which then existed in the Confederacy with that now in South Africa, it must also be remembered that General Lee assumed the responsibility he did assume, and decided the policy to be pursued in the way it was decided, under no ameliorating conditions. Politically, unconditional surrender was insisted upon; and Lee’s surrender was, politically, unconditional.
Even more so was Johnston’s; for, in Johnston’s case, the modifying terms of capitulation agreed on in the first place between him and Sherman were roughly disallowed at Washington, and the truce, by an order coming thence, abruptly terminated.
Then Johnston did what Lee had already done; ignoring Davis, he surrendered his army.
In the case of the Confederacy, an absolutely unconditional political surrender implied much. The Emancipation Proclamation of January, 1863, which confiscated the most valuable chattel property of the Confederacy, remained the irreversible law of the land.
The inhabitants of the South were, moreover, as one man disfranchised. When they laid down their arms they had before them, first, a military government, and second, the supremacy of their former slaves. A harder fate for a proud people to accept could not well be imagined. The bitterness of feeling, the hatred, was, too, extreme.
It may possibly be argued that the conditions in this country then were different from those now in South Africa, inasmuch as here it was a civil war, a conflict between communities of the same race and speech, involving the vital question of the supremacy of law. This argument, however, seems to imply that, in case of strife of this description, a general severity may fairly be resorted to in excess of that permissible between nations—in other words, that we are justified in treating our brethren with greater harshness than we would treat aliens in blood and speech.
Obviously, this is a questionable contention.
It might also be claimed that the bitterness of civil war is not so insurmountable as that of one involving a question of race dominance. Yet it is difficult to conceive bitterness of greater intensity than existed between the sections at the close of our Civil War.
There is striking evidence of this in the book of Mr. John S. Wise, from which I have already quoted. Toward its close he speaks of the death of Lincoln.
He adds the following:
Even more so was Johnston’s; for, in Johnston’s case, the modifying terms of capitulation agreed on in the first place between him and Sherman were roughly disallowed at Washington, and the truce, by an order coming thence, abruptly terminated.
Then Johnston did what Lee had already done; ignoring Davis, he surrendered his army.
In the case of the Confederacy, an absolutely unconditional political surrender implied much. The Emancipation Proclamation of January, 1863, which confiscated the most valuable chattel property of the Confederacy, remained the irreversible law of the land.
The inhabitants of the South were, moreover, as one man disfranchised. When they laid down their arms they had before them, first, a military government, and second, the supremacy of their former slaves. A harder fate for a proud people to accept could not well be imagined. The bitterness of feeling, the hatred, was, too, extreme.
It may possibly be argued that the conditions in this country then were different from those now in South Africa, inasmuch as here it was a civil war, a conflict between communities of the same race and speech, involving the vital question of the supremacy of law. This argument, however, seems to imply that, in case of strife of this description, a general severity may fairly be resorted to in excess of that permissible between nations—in other words, that we are justified in treating our brethren with greater harshness than we would treat aliens in blood and speech.
Obviously, this is a questionable contention.
It might also be claimed that the bitterness of civil war is not so insurmountable as that of one involving a question of race dominance. Yet it is difficult to conceive bitterness of greater intensity than existed between the sections at the close of our Civil War.
There is striking evidence of this in the book of Mr. John S. Wise, from which I have already quoted. Toward its close he speaks of the death of Lincoln.
He adds the following:
“Perhaps I ought to chronicle that the announcement was received with demonstrations of sorrow.
“If I did, I would be lying for sentiments’ sake.
“Among the higher officers and the most intelligent and conservative men, the assassination caused a shudder of horror at the heinousness of the act, and at the thought of its possible consequences; but among the thoughtless, the desperate, and the ignorant, it was hailed as a sort of retributive justice.
“In maturer years I have been ashamed of what I felt and said when I heard of that awful calamity. However, men ought to be judged for their feelings and their speech by the circumstances of their surroundings. [Footnote #6]
“For four years we had been fighting. In that struggle, all we loved had been lost. Lincoln incarnated to us the idea of oppression and conquest. We had seen his face over the coffins of our brothers, relatives and friends, in the flames of Richmond, in the disaster at Appomattox.
“In blood and flame and torture the temples of our lives were tumbling about our heads. We were desperate and vindictive, and whosoever denies it, forgets or is false.
“We greeted his death in a spirit of reckless hate, and hailed it as bringing agony and bitterness to those who were the cause of our own agony and bitterness. To us, Lincoln was an inhuman monster, Grant a butcher, and Sherman a fiend.”
What if Robert E. Lee Had Supported Jefferson Davis’ Unyielding Position?
Indeed, recalling the circumstances of that time, it is fairly appalling to consider what in 1865 must have occurred had Robert E. Lee then been of the same turn of mind as Jefferson Davis, or as implacable and unyielding in disposition as Kruger or Botha have more recently proved.
The national government [the Union] had in arms a million men, inured to the hardships and accustomed to the brutalities of war; Lincoln had been freshly assassinated; the temper of the North was thoroughly aroused, while its patience was exhausted.
An irregular warfare would inevitably have resulted, a warfare without quarter.
The Confederacy would have been reduced to a smoldering wilderness—to what South Africa is today. In such a death grapple, the North, both in morale and in means, would have suffered only less than the South.
This fate was averted for both sections—North and South. [Footnote #7]
The national government [the Union] had in arms a million men, inured to the hardships and accustomed to the brutalities of war; Lincoln had been freshly assassinated; the temper of the North was thoroughly aroused, while its patience was exhausted.
An irregular warfare would inevitably have resulted, a warfare without quarter.
The Confederacy would have been reduced to a smoldering wilderness—to what South Africa is today. In such a death grapple, the North, both in morale and in means, would have suffered only less than the South.
This fate was averted for both sections—North and South. [Footnote #7]
Use a Current Event to Look Back on United States History
It is not my purpose to enter into any criticism of the course of events in South Africa, or of the policy there on either side pursued. It will be for the future to decide whether the prolonged, irregular resistance we are witnessing is justifiable, or, if justifiable, whether it is wise. Neither of these questions do I propose to discuss.
My purpose simply is to call attention, in view of what is now taking place elsewhere, to the narrow escape we ourselves, thirty-six years ago, had from a similar awful catastrophe.
And I again say that, as we look today upon Kruger and Botha and De Wet, and the situation existing in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, I doubt if one single man in the United States, North or South—whether he participated in the Civil War or was born since that war ended—would fail to acknowledge an infinite debt of gratitude to the Confederate leader, who on the 9th of April, 1865, decided, as he did decide, that the United States, whether Confederate or Union, was a Christian community, and that his duty was to accept the responsibility which the fate of war had imposed upon him—to decide in favor of a new national life, even if slowly and painfully, to be built up by his own people under conditions arbitrarily and by force imposed on them.
My purpose simply is to call attention, in view of what is now taking place elsewhere, to the narrow escape we ourselves, thirty-six years ago, had from a similar awful catastrophe.
And I again say that, as we look today upon Kruger and Botha and De Wet, and the situation existing in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, I doubt if one single man in the United States, North or South—whether he participated in the Civil War or was born since that war ended—would fail to acknowledge an infinite debt of gratitude to the Confederate leader, who on the 9th of April, 1865, decided, as he did decide, that the United States, whether Confederate or Union, was a Christian community, and that his duty was to accept the responsibility which the fate of war had imposed upon him—to decide in favor of a new national life, even if slowly and painfully, to be built up by his own people under conditions arbitrarily and by force imposed on them.
Robert E. Lee Returns Home
In one of the Confederate accounts of the great war is to be found the following description of Lee’s return to his Richmond home immediately after he had at Appomattox sealed the fate of the Confederacy.
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With it I will conclude this paper. [Footnote #8]
“On the afternoon of the previous day, the first of those paroled [Footnote #9] from the surrendered Army of Northern Virginia had straggled back to Richmond. |
Image is from McClure’s Magazine, April 1901: “Disbanding the Confederate Army” by Ida M. Tarbell.
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Footnotes:
[#1] A limber-chest is a wooden chest used to store ammunition for use in the field. When being transported, the chests were often attached to the artillery limber—a two-wheeled cart that supported an artillery piece and allowed it to be towed. It often served as a seat for the cannoneers.
[#2] Elsewhere in his book (pp. 358, 359), and in another connection, J. S. Wise is equally severe in his characterization of Bushrod Johnson.
[#3] The End of an Era, pp. 433-435.
[#4] Alfriend’s “Life of Jefferson Davis,” pp. 622—626
[#5] Fuit Ilium is a Latin quotation from Virgil's Aeneid that means “Troy is no more.”
[#6] This author believes that too many so-called “historians” either fail to properly access the “circumstances of the surroundings” of a historical event, or choose to ignore the “surroundings” and judge men of an earlier age with the perspective, morality, short-sighted and, yes, bigoted—in its own way, the perspective of “today.” John S. Wise does a wonderful job here conveying the reasons for the soldiers’ reactions at the time, and he then conveys the effect of gaining more knowledge, wisdom and perspective that only time can and will bring to the wise.
[#7] The following footnote is used from Wikipedia only as an unverified reference—not necessarily an “authoritative” source. This author believes that all Wikipedia information should be either verified or acknowledged as “unverified” when used: “The Boer War guerrilla campaign proved difficult for the British to defeat, due to unfamiliarity with guerrilla tactics and extensive support for the guerrillas among civilians. In response to failures to defeat the guerrillas, British high command ordered scorched earth policies as part of a large scale and multi-pronged counterinsurgency campaign; a network of nets, blockhouses, strongpoints and barbed wire fences was constructed, virtually partitioning the occupied republics.”
[#8] De Leon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, p. 367
[#9] Parole is “an agreement between a prisoner of war and their captors that the prisoner, upon release, will not again take up arms against those who captured them—in this case the United States, for a defined time period or for the duration of the war.”
[#10] General Alexander documented in a letter to Charles Adams the following after this speech:
“The universal desire to express to General Lee the unabated love and confidence of the army had, led to the formation of the gunners of a few battalions of artillery along the roadside, with orders to take off their hats in silence as he rode by. When he approached, however, the men could not be restrained, but burst into the wildest cheering, which the adjacent infantry lines took up; and, breaking ranks, they all crowded around him, cheering at the tops of their voices.
“General Lee stopped his horse and, after gaining silence, made the only speech to his men that he ever made. He was very brief, and gave no excuses or apologies for his surrender, but said he had done all in his power for his men, and urged them to go as quickly and quietly to their homes as possible, to resume peaceful avocations, and to be as good citizens as they had been soldiers; and this advice marked the course which he himself pursued so faithfully to the end.”
[#1] A limber-chest is a wooden chest used to store ammunition for use in the field. When being transported, the chests were often attached to the artillery limber—a two-wheeled cart that supported an artillery piece and allowed it to be towed. It often served as a seat for the cannoneers.
[#2] Elsewhere in his book (pp. 358, 359), and in another connection, J. S. Wise is equally severe in his characterization of Bushrod Johnson.
[#3] The End of an Era, pp. 433-435.
[#4] Alfriend’s “Life of Jefferson Davis,” pp. 622—626
[#5] Fuit Ilium is a Latin quotation from Virgil's Aeneid that means “Troy is no more.”
[#6] This author believes that too many so-called “historians” either fail to properly access the “circumstances of the surroundings” of a historical event, or choose to ignore the “surroundings” and judge men of an earlier age with the perspective, morality, short-sighted and, yes, bigoted—in its own way, the perspective of “today.” John S. Wise does a wonderful job here conveying the reasons for the soldiers’ reactions at the time, and he then conveys the effect of gaining more knowledge, wisdom and perspective that only time can and will bring to the wise.
[#7] The following footnote is used from Wikipedia only as an unverified reference—not necessarily an “authoritative” source. This author believes that all Wikipedia information should be either verified or acknowledged as “unverified” when used: “The Boer War guerrilla campaign proved difficult for the British to defeat, due to unfamiliarity with guerrilla tactics and extensive support for the guerrillas among civilians. In response to failures to defeat the guerrillas, British high command ordered scorched earth policies as part of a large scale and multi-pronged counterinsurgency campaign; a network of nets, blockhouses, strongpoints and barbed wire fences was constructed, virtually partitioning the occupied republics.”
[#8] De Leon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals, p. 367
[#9] Parole is “an agreement between a prisoner of war and their captors that the prisoner, upon release, will not again take up arms against those who captured them—in this case the United States, for a defined time period or for the duration of the war.”
[#10] General Alexander documented in a letter to Charles Adams the following after this speech:
“The universal desire to express to General Lee the unabated love and confidence of the army had, led to the formation of the gunners of a few battalions of artillery along the roadside, with orders to take off their hats in silence as he rode by. When he approached, however, the men could not be restrained, but burst into the wildest cheering, which the adjacent infantry lines took up; and, breaking ranks, they all crowded around him, cheering at the tops of their voices.
“General Lee stopped his horse and, after gaining silence, made the only speech to his men that he ever made. He was very brief, and gave no excuses or apologies for his surrender, but said he had done all in his power for his men, and urged them to go as quickly and quietly to their homes as possible, to resume peaceful avocations, and to be as good citizens as they had been soldiers; and this advice marked the course which he himself pursued so faithfully to the end.”